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Abstract
Over the last decade, combinatorial algorithms have been obtained for exactly solving
several nonlinear convex programs. We first provide a formal context to this activity by
introducing the notion of rational convex programs – this also enables us to identify a
number of questions for further study. So far, such algorithms were obtained for total
problems only. Our main contribution is developing the methodology for handling non-
total problems, i.e., their associated convex programs may be infeasible for certain settings
of the parameters.
The specific problem we study pertains to a Nash bargaining game, called ADNB,
which is derived from the linear case of the Arrow-Debreu market model. We reduce this
game to computing an equilibrium in a new market model called flexible budget market,
and we obtain primal-dual algorithms for determining feasibility, as well as giving a proof
of infeasibility and finding an equilibrium. We give an application of our combinatorial
algorithm for ADNB to an important “fair” throughput allocation problem on a wireless
channel.
∗College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332–0280, E-mail:
vazirani@cc.gatech.edu.
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1 Introduction
The fascinating question of computability of market equilibria, which has been studied exten-
sively within TCS over the last decade, has provided the area of algorithms a new direction,
namely the design of efficient combinatorial algorithms1 for exactly solving nonlinear convex
programs. For this purpose, the classical primal-dual paradigm was suitably extended from its
usual setting of LP-duality theory to convex programs and the KKT conditions; this task was
initiated in [DPSV08].
We note that all problems attacked so far were total, i.e., their convex programs always have
finite optimal solutions. The main contribution of this paper is to develop the methodology
for handling problems that are not guaranteed to always have a solution, i.e., their convex
programs may be infeasible for certain settings of the parameters. It turns out that in the
setting of LP’s, the primal-dual algorithms for non-total problems are not more involved than
those for total problems. We illustrate this by comparing the algorithms for the problems
of maximum weight perfect matching and maximum weight matching in bipartite graphs in
Section 10. However, the situation is quite different for convex programs; see Section 1.2 for a
high level description and Section 10 for a detailed analysis.
The specific question that led to these ideas was combinatorially solving Nash bargaining
games. Nash bargaining [Nas50] is a central solution concept within game theory for “fair”
allocation of utility among competing players in the presence of complete information; it has
numerous applications and a large following, e.g., see [Kal85, TL89, OR94]. The solution to
a Nash bargaining game is obtained by maximizing a concave function over a convex set, i.e.,
it is the solution to a convex program. If the conditions for efficiently running the ellipsoid
algorithm hold [GLS88], in particular, if efficient separation oracles can be implemented for its
constraints and objective function, then the solution can be obtained to any required degree of
accuracy in polynomial time. Instead, we resorted to the design of combinatorial algorithms
because they have several advantages over “continuous” algorithms, see Section 1.1.
The specific Nash bargaining game we study in this paper is called the Arrow-Debreu Nash
Bargaining Game, abbreviated ADNB. The setup is the same as the linear case of the Arrow-
Debreu market model, but instead of resorting to the solution concept of a market equilibrium
for reallocating goods among the agents, we resort to a Nash bargaining solution. Interestingly
enough, our algorithm for solving ADNB reduces it to a new, natural market model, which
we call the flexible budget market.
In the next section, we first provide a formal, mathematical context to the new algorithmic
activity mentioned above. This also enables us to identify a number of questions for further
study, see Section 12.
1Informally, an algorithm that conducts a search over a discrete space. A key distinction is that whereas a
continuous method gives a way of solving the LP or convex program underlying a given instance, and provides
no insight about the problem itself, a combinatorial algorithm handles all instances of the specific problem by
exploiting its special combinatorial structure, e.g., see [Vaz10c] for a detailed argument.
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1.1 Rational convex programs and combinatorial algorithms for them
A combinatorial algorithm for exactly solving a convex program is possible only if it admits
rational solutions. Starting with the classic Eisenberg-Gale convex program [EG59], whose
solution yields an equilibrium for the linear case of Fisher’s market model [DPSV08], in re-
cent years, researchers have identified several interesting convex programs that always admit
rational solutions. First, let us formally define this class. We will say that a nonlinear convex
program is rational if, for any setting of its parameters to rational numbers such that it has a
finite optimal solution, it admits an optimal solution that is rational and can be written using
polynomially many bits in the number of bits needed to write all the parameters.
This class turns out to be surprisingly rich – besides several Nash bargaining games [Vaz10a],
it captures the Fisher market model under several classes of utility functions: linear [EG59,
DPSV08], utility functions defined via combinatorial problems, including some in Kelly’s
[Kel97] resource allocation model [JV08, CDV], spending constraint utilities [Vaz10b, BDX10],
and piecewise-linear concave utilities in a market model that allows for perfect price discrimi-
nation [GV10]. It also captures the linear case of the Arrow-Debreu market model (this follows
from the convex program of [Jai07] and a proof of rationality in [Eav76]).
Of course, rationality does not guarantee the existence of a combinatorial polynomial time
algorithm. However, it turns out that such algorithms are known for solving almost all of
the rational convex programs mentioned above. The only exceptions are 2-agent markets and
Nash bargaining games given in [CDV] and [Vaz10a], and the linear case of Arrow-Debreu
markets. For the former, polynomial time algorithms are given, in [CDV] and [Vaz10a], using
only an LP-solver. This leads to a tantalizing question: is the class of rational convex programs
solvable in this manner, i.e., by polynomial time algorithms that use only an LP-solver?
Both algorithmic approaches, continuous and combinatorial, are valuable in their own right
and have different advantages. Indeed, it is the synergy between these two approaches that
makes algorithm design a potent field. We point out the advantages of the latter approach
below.
We believe that the case for designing combinatorial algorithms for rational convex programs is
as compelling as that for integral LP’s, i.e., linear programs that always admit integral optimal
solutions. The latter led to deep combinatorial insights and constitute a substantial part of
the field of combinatorial optimization. In recent years, insights gained from combinatorial
algorithms for convex programs have also led to major progress. For instance, the recent proof
of membership in PPAD of markets under piecewise-linear concave utilities [VY10] followed
from a new, combinatorial way of characterizing equilibria [DPSV08] and helped settle, together
with [CDDT09, CT09], the long-standing open problem of determining the exact complexity
of this key case of markets.
Combinatorial algorithms also have several advantages over continuous algorithms in applica-
tions. For instance, recently Nisan et. al., faced with the problem of designing an auction
system for Google for TV ads, converged to a market equilibrium based method, after explor-
ing several different options [NBC+09]. As stated by Nisan [Nis09], the actual implementation
of this algorithm was inspired by combinatorial market equilibrium algorithms, which in turn
solve convex programs combinatorially. Indeed, the easy adaptability of combinatorial algo-
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rithms to the special idiosyncrasies of an application often makes them the preferred method.
In Section 4 we present an application of our combinatorial algorithm for ADNB to a through-
put allocation problem on a wireless channel.
Although our algorithm is not strongly polynomial, recent results provide a reason to believe
that our methodology could lead to it. Using scaling techniques, Orlin [Orl10] extended the
DPSV algorithm to a strongly polynomial one, and an obvious open question is to extend the
rest of the algorithms for rational convex programs as well.
1.2 Determining feasibility of a convex program
A linear program is infeasible iff no point satisfies all its constraints. In the case of a convex
program, infeasibility could arise because of a second reason, namely the objective function is
undefined at each point that satisfies all constraints. The convex program for ADNB exhibits
only the second type of infeasibility; it always has points satisfying all constraints.
Even for the case of total problems, the primal-dual method operates in fundamentally different
ways in the two settings of integral linear programs and rational convex programs; for details,
see Section 4 in [DPSV08] or Section 10 of the present paper. This difference manifests itself
even more acutely when we move to non-total problems, as shown in detail in Section 10.
For solving ADNB, we give a special procedure, Stage I in Algorithm 1, that tests for fea-
sibility. If the instance is found to be infeasible, this procedure finds a proof of infeasibility.
Otherwise, it yields special prices, called feasible prices, which provide Stage II with the right
starting point for finding a solution to the given instance.
We give two different proofs of infeasibility. The first one uses an explicit dual of the convex
program for ADNB, found by Devanur [Dev10]; for proving infeasibility, our procedure shows
that this dual is unbounded. Often it is difficult to find an explicit dual of a convex program.
For this reason, we give a second proof of infeasibility. We give an LP whose optimal solution
is positive iff the given instance is feasible. Therefore, a dual feasible solution of value at most
zero is a proof of infeasibility. Our procedure also finds such a proof of infeasibility.
1.3 New insights into balanced flows
Differences between complementary slackness conditions for an LP and the KKT conditions
for a convex program (see Section 4 in [DPSV08]) leads to new difficulties in the latter setting.
The new algorithmic idea of balanced flows, introduced in [DPSV08], helps overcome these
difficulties. Although this notion yields the desired efficient algorithm, the use of the l2 norm
in the potential function used for proving polynomial time termination makes the proofs quite
difficult. [DPSV08] observe that the l2 norm can be dispensed with for defining balanced flows
and ask, “Can a polynomial running time be established for the algorithm using the alternative
definition, thereby dispensing with the l2 norm altogether? At present we see no way of doing
this ... .”
In Section 11 we answer this question in the negative by providing an infinite family of exam-
ples in which the natural l1 norm-based potential function makes inverse exponentially small
progress whereas the l2 norm-based potential function makes inverse polynomial progress.
4
We observe that the combinatorial algorithms of [Vaz10b] and [GV10], which solve rational
convex programs, also use the notion of balanced flows crucially. Balanced flows play an even
more fundamental role in our work. As detailed in Section 8.4, they are used in several crucial
ways in both stages of our algorithm. In addition, they are also used for defining the central
notion of feasible prices.
2 The Nash Bargaining Game
An n-person Nash bargaining game consists of a pair (N , c), where N ⊆ Rn+ is a compact,
convex set and c ∈ N . Set N is the feasible set and its elements give utilities that the n players
can simultaneously accrue. Point c is the disagreement point – it gives the utilities that the n
players obtain if they decide not to cooperate. The set of n agents will be denoted by B and
the agents will be numbered 1, 2, . . . n. Game (N , c) is said to be feasible if there is a point
v ∈ N such that ∀i ∈ B, vi > ci, and infeasible otherwise.
The solution to a feasible game is the point v ∈ N that satisfies the following four axioms:
1. Pareto optimality: No point in N can weakly dominate v.
2. Invariance under affine transformations of utilities: If the utilities of any player
are redefined by multiplying by a scalar and adding a constant, then the solution to the
transformed game is obtained by applying these operations to the particular coordinate
of v.
3. Symmetry: If the players are renumbered, then it suffices to renumber the coordinates
of v accordingly.
4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: If v is the solution for (N , c), and S ⊆ Rn+
is a compact, convex set satisfying c ∈ S and v ∈ S ⊆ N , then v is also the solution for
(S, c).
Via an elegant proof, Nash proved:
Theorem 1 Nash [Nas50] If game (N , c) is feasible then there is a unique point in N satis-
fying the axioms stated above. This is also the unique point that maximizes Πi∈B(vi − ci), over
all v ∈ N .
Most papers in game theory assume that the given Nash bargaining game (N , c) is feasible.
However, in this paper, it will be more natural to not make this assumption and to determine
this fact algorithmically. Thus, we can have one of 2 outcomes:
Thus Nash’s solution to his bargaining game involves maximizing a concave function over a
convex domain, and is therefore the optimal solution to the following convex program.
maximize
∑
i∈B
log(vi − ci) (1)
subject to v ∈ N
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As a consequence, if for a specific game, a separation oracle can be implemented in polynomial
time, then using the ellipsoid algorithm one can get as good an approximation to the solution
of this convex program as desired in time polynomial in the number of bits of accuracy needed
[GLS88].
3 The Game ADNB
The game ADNB, short for Arrow-Debreu Nash Bargaining game, which will be studied
extensively, is derived from the linear case of the Arrow-Debreu model. We state the latter
first. Let B = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of agents and G = {1, 2, . . . , g} be a set of divisible goods.
We will assume w.l.o.g. that there is a unit amount of each good. Let uij be the utility derived
by agent i on receiving one unit of good j; w.l.o.g., we will assume that uij is integral. If xij
is the amount of good j that agent i gets, for 1 ≤ j ≤ g, then she derives total utility
vi(x) =
∑
j∈G
uijxij .
Finally, we assume that each agent has an initial endowment of these goods; for each good,
the total amount possessed by the agents is 1 unit.
W.l.o.g. we may assume that each good is desired by at least one agent and each agent desires
at least one good, i.e.,
∀j ∈ G, ∃i ∈ B : uij > 0 and ∀i ∈ B, ∃j ∈ G : uij > 0.
If not, we can remove the good or the agent from consideration.
The question is to find prices for these goods so that if each agent sells her entire initial endow-
ment at these prices and uses the money to buy an optimal bundle of goods, the market clears
exactly, i.e., there is no deficiency or surplus of any good. Such prices are called equilibrium
prices.
The Arrow-Debreu market model gives one mechanism by which the agents can redistribute
goods to achieve higher utilities. Another mechanism is to view this setup as a Nash bargain-
ing game as follows. For each i ∈ B, let ci denote the utility derived by agent i from her
initial endowment. Regard this as agent i’s disagreement utility and redistribute the goods in
accordance with the Nash bargaining solution.
We will define game ADNB in a slightly more general manner: we will assume that the
disagreement utilities, ci’s, are arbitrary numbers specified in the particular instance. (As
stated in the Introduction, we will not deal with the nonsymmetric extension of ADNB in
this paper.) Clearly, the Nash bargaining solution is the optimal solution to the following
convex program:
maximize
∑
i∈B
log(vi − ci) (2)
subject to ∀i ∈ B : vi =
∑
j∈G
uijxij
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∀j ∈ G :
∑
i∈B
xij ≤ 1
∀i ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G : xij ≥ 0
The KKT conditions for this program are:
(1) ∀j ∈ G : pj ≥ 0.
(2) ∀j ∈ G : pj > 0 ⇒
∑
i∈B xij = 1.
(3) ∀i ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G : pj ≥
uij
vi−ci
.
(4) ∀i ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G : xij > 0 ⇒pj =
uij
vi−ci
.
Theorem 2 Program (2) is a rational convex program. Moreover, if it is feasible, then the
dual solution is unique.
Proof : We will show that if for a setting of rational parameters, program (2) is feasible,
then the xij ’s and pj’s are solutions to an LP and are therefore rational numbers that can be
written using polynomially many bits. First, guess the xij ’s that are non-zero in the optimal
solution to program (2). Because of the assumption made on the instance, each pj will be
positive.
The variables of the LP will be the non-zero xij’s and for each good j, a new variable qj,
which is supposed to represent 1/pj . The LP will have the following constraints: for each qj,
there is one equation corresponding to the KKT condition (2), and for each nonzero xij there
is one equation corresponding to the KKT condition (4). In addition, the LP has inequality
constraints corresponding to KKT condition (3), for each i ∈ B and j ∈ G. In all these
constraints, vi is replaced by
∑
j∈G uijxij. Finally, it has non-negativity constraints for all
xij ’s and qj’s. It is easy to check that all constraints are linear.
Since program (2) is feasible, so is the LP corresponding to the correct guess. The solution to
this LP will satisfy all KKT conditions and hence is an optimal solution to program (2). This
established rationality of the convex program. Finally, the strict concavity of the objective
function of program (2) and the fact that the convex combination of any two of its feasible
solutions is also feasible implies that the optimal values of vi’s is unique. Now, using the KKT
condition (4), we get the uniqueness of pj’s as well. ✷
4 An Application to Throughput Allocation
on a Wireless Channel
A central throughput allocation problem arising in the context of a wireless channel, such as
in 3G technologies, is the following. There are n users 1, 2, . . . n and the wireless router can be
in any of m different states 1, 2, . . . m whose probabilities, pi(j), can be estimated by sampling.
Each user i derives utility at rate uij if it is connected to the router while the router is in state
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j; the uij’s are known. No matter what state the router is in, only one user can be connected to
it. If user i is given connection for xij ≤ pi(j) of the time the router is in state j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
then the total utility derived by i is vi =
∑m
j=1 uijxij. Clearly, we must ensure the constraint∑n
i=1 xij ≤ pi(j), for each j. The question is to find a “fair” way of dividing the pi(j)’s among
the users.
The method of choice in the networking community is to use Kelly’s proportional fair scheme
[Kel97], which entails maximizing
∑
i log vi subject to the constraints given above, i.e., solving
the Eisenberg-Gale convex program [EG59]. Observe that the above setting can be viewed
as a linear Fisher market with n users and m divisible goods. An elegant gradient descent
algorithm for solving this convex program, given by David Tse [Tse] (see also [JPP00]), was
implemented by Qualcomm in their chip sets and is used by numerous 3G wireless basestations
[And09]. However, this solution may at times allocate unacceptably low utility to certain users.
This was countered by giving users the ability to put a lower bound on channel rates, say ci
for user i. This enhanced problem was solved by changing the objective function of the convex
program to maximizing
∑
i log(vi − ci); observe that this is precisely an instance of ADNB!
However, now the gradient descent implementation ran into problems of instability, since it
involved computing uij/(v
′
i− ci), where v
′
i is the current estimate of vi; at intermediate points,
the denominator may be too small or even negative.
A different solution, proposed and implemented by researchers at Lucent [AQS05], was to
introduce the constraints vi > ci in the Eisenberg-Gale program itself. The fairness guarantee
achieved by this solution is unclear. Additionally, determining feasibility of the convex program
now became a major issue [And09]. Instead, we have proposed experimenting with a heuristic
adaptation of our combinatorial algorithm for ADNB, which will not have stability issues.
As reported in the FOCS 2002 version of [DPSV08], an analogous heuristic adaptation of the
DPSV algorithm was found to perform well on fairly large sized linear Fisher instances.
5 Fisher’s Model and its Extension via Flexible Budgets
First we specify Fisher’s market model for the case of linear utilities [BS00]. Consider a market
consisting of a set of n buyers B = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and a set of g divisible goods, G = {1, 2, . . . , g};
we may assume w.l.o.g. that there is a unit amount of each good. Let mi be the money
possessed by buyer i, i ∈ B. Let uij be the utility derived by buyer i on receiving one unit of
good j. Thus, if xij is the amount of good j that buyer i gets, for 1 ≤ j ≤ g, then the total
utility derived by i is
vi(x) =
g∑
j=1
uijxij .
The problem is to find prices p = {p1, p2, . . . , pg} for the goods so that when each buyer is given
her utility maximizing bundle of goods, the market clears, i.e., each good having a positive
price is exactly sold, without there being any deficiency or surplus. Such prices are called
market clearing prices or equilibrium prices.
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The following is the Eisenberg-Gale convex program. Using the KKT conditions, one can
show that its optimal solution is an equilibrium allocation for Fisher’s linear market and the
Lagrange variables corresponding to the inequalities give equilibrium prices for the goods (e.g.,
see Theorem 5.1 in [Vaz07]).
maximize
∑
i∈B
mi log vi (3)
subject to ∀i ∈ B : vi =
∑
j∈G
uijxij
∀j ∈ G :
∑
i∈B
xij ≤ 1
∀i ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G : xij ≥ 0
Next, we introduce a flexible budget market as a modification of Fisher’s linear case; this
market will be used for solving ADNB. The utility functions of buyers are as before. The two
main differences are that each buyer i now has a parameter ci giving a strict lower bound on
the amount of utility she wants to derive and buyers do not come to the market with a fixed
amount of money, but instead the money they spend is a function of prices of goods in the
following manner. Given prices p for the goods, define the maximum bang-per-buck of buyer i
to be
γi = maxj
{
uij
pj
}
.
Now, buyer i’s money is defined to be mi = 1 +
ci
γi
.
Let us say that set Si = argmaxj
{
uij
pj
}
constitutes i’s maximum bang-per-buck goods. Clearly,
at prices p, any utility maximizing bundle of goods for i will consist of goods from Si costing
mi money. Again the problem is to find market clearing or equilibrium prices. Observe that
in an equilibrium, if it exists, each buyer i will derive utility exceeding ci.
5.1 The Reduction
An instance I of ADNB is transformed to a flexible budget market M as stated above.
Theorem 3 Instance I is feasible iff M is feasible. Moreover, if I and M are both feasible,
then allocations x and dual p are optimal for I iff they are equilibrium allocations and prices
for the flexible budget market M.
Proof : (⇒) First assume that I is feasible and that allocations x and dual p are optimal
for RNB game I. Then I must satisfy the KKT conditions for convex program (2).
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By the second KKT condition, each good having a positive price is fully sold. Assume that
yij > 0. Then, by the definition of γi and the fourth KKT condition,
γi =
uij
pj
= vi − ci.
The money of buyer i at prices p in market M is defined to be mi = 1 + ci/γi. The money
spent by i in market M is:
∑
j∈G
xijpj =
∑
j∈G
xijuij
γi
=
1
vi − ci
∑
j∈G
xijuij =
ci
vi − ci
= 1 +
ci
vi − ci
= 1 +
ci
γi
= mi.
Furthermore, by the third and fourth KKT conditions, i buys only her maximum bang-per-buck
objects, thereby getting an optimal bundle. This proves that x and p constitute equilibrium
allocations and prices for market M.
(⇐) Next, assume that M is feasible and that x and p are equilibrium allocations and prices
for market M. Now, x is clearly feasible for program (2); we will show that x and p satisfy
all the KKT conditions for this program. The first two conditions are obvious.
Since i gets an optimal bundle of objects at prices p,
xij > 0 ⇒
uik
pj
= γi.
Since i spends all her money,
mi = 1 +
ci
γi
=
∑
j∈G
xijpj =
∑
k∈Ti
yik
uik
γi
=
vi
γi
.
Therefore, γi = vi − ci. This gives the last two conditions as well. ✷
6 A Test for Equilibrium Prices
We will present an efficient algorithm for solving an instance I of the game ADNB by first
reducing it to a flexible budget market, say M. In this section, we first give an efficient
algorithm for the following simpler question: Given prices p = {p1, . . . pg} for the goods inM,
determine if these are equilibrium prices, and if so, find an equilibrium allocation.
First, construct a directed network N(p) as follows. N(p) has a source s, a sink t, and vertex
subsets B and G corresponding to the buyers and goods, respectively. For each good j ∈ G,
there is an edge (s, j) of capacity pj, and for each buyer i ∈ B, there is an edge (i, t) of
capacity mi, where mi = 1 + ci/γi is i’s money in M. Recall that Si contains i’s maximum
bang-per-buck goods. The edges between G and B are precisely the maximum bang-per-buck
edges, i.e., those (j, i) such that j ∈ Si. Each of these edges has infinite capacity.
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Lemma 4 Prices p are equilibrium prices forM iff the two cuts (s,B∪G∪t) and (s∪B∪G, t)
are min-cuts in network N(p). Moreover, if p are equilibrium prices, then the set of equilibrium
allocations corresponds exactly to max-flows in N(p).
The proof of this lemma is straightforward using the transformation between a max-flow f in
N(p) and an allocation x in M given by xij = f(j, i)/pj . The condition that (s,B ∪ G ∪ t)
and (s∪B ∪G, t) are min-cuts in network N(p), and hence saturated by f , corresponds to all
goods being sold and all buyers’ money being spent. The fact that (j, i) is an edge in N(p)
iff j ∈ Si ensures that buyers get only their maximum bang-per-buck goods. Clearly, one
max-flow computation suffices to determine if prices p are equilibrium prices for M.
The next lemma gives the combinatorial object that yields equilibrium prices. Assume that
p
∗ are equilibrium prices, i.e., N(p∗) satisfies the condition in Lemma 4. Let H be the unca-
pacitated directed subgraph of N(p∗) induced on B ∪G.
Lemma 5 Given H, we can find p∗ in strongly polynomial time.
Proof : Consider the connected components of H after ignoring directions on its edges. In
each component, pick a good and assign it price p, say. The prices of the rest of the goods
in this component can be obtained in terms of p. The bang-per-buck, and hence the money,
of each buyer in this component can also be obtained in terms of p. Finally, by equating the
money of all buyers in this component with the total value of all goods in this component, we
can compute p. ✷
Given two d-dimensional vectors with non-negative coordinates, p and q, we will say that p
weakly dominates q if for each coordinate j, qj ≤ pj. The following characterization will be
useful in Algorithm 3.
Lemma 6 Assume that market M is feasible and p is its unique equilibrium price vector. Let
q be a vector of positive prices such that (s,B ∪G ∪ t) is a min-cut in network N(q). Then p
weakly dominates q.
Proof : Let us assume, for establishing a contradiction, that there are goods j such that
qj > pj and yet (s,B ∪G ∪ t) is a min-cut in N(q). Let
θ = max
j∈G
{
qj
pj
}
and S = {j ∈ G | qj = θpj}.
Clearly, θ > 1.
Let Tp and Tq be the set of buyers who are interested in goods in S at prices p and q, respectively.
Since S represents the set of goods whose prices increase by the largest factor in going from
prices p to q, Tq ⊆ Tp. We claim that a buyer i ∈ Tq is not interested in any goods in G−S at
prices p (because otherwise at prices q, i will not be interested in any goods in S, since their
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prices increased the most). Therefore, in any max-flow in N(p), all flow going through nodes
in Tq must also have used nodes in S. Therefore,
∑
j∈S
pj ≥
∑
i∈Tq
(
1 +
ci
γi
)
,
where γi is the maximum bang-per-buck of buyer i w.r.t. prices p. Multiplying this inequality
by θ and using the fact that θ > 1 we get,
θ
∑
j∈S
pj ≥
∑
i∈Tq
(
θ +
ciθ
γi
)
>
∑
i∈Tq
(
1 +
ciθ
γi
)
,
Observe that the maximum bang-per-buck of buyer i ∈ Tq w.r.t. prices q is γi/θ. Therefore,
the last inequality implies that w.r.t. prices q, the total value of goods in S is strictly more
than the total value of money possessed by buyers in Tq. On the other hand, since in N(q) all
flow using nodes of Tq goes through S, we get that (s,B ∪G ∪ t) is not a min-cut in network
N(q), leading to a contradiction. ✷
Next assume that M is an arbitrary flexible budget market, not necessarily feasible. We will
say that prices q are small if q is a positive vector and (s,B ∪ G ∪ t) is a min-cut in network
N(q). Observe that in this case, each good j must have an edge (j, i), for some buyer i, incident
at it. By Lemma 6, if M is feasible and prices q are small, then they are weakly dominated
by the equilibrium prices, p. Observe however that the contrapositive of Lemma 6 does not
hold, i.e., p may dominate positive prices q, yet (s,B∪G∪ t) may not be a min-cut in network
N(q).
The background given so far will suffice to read Section A, which gives an algorithm that
converges to the solution of a given feasible instance of ADNB in the limit. This section may
serve as a suitable warm-up, since our polynomial time algorithm is quite involved.
7 Determining Feasibility
In this section, we will address the question of determining whether the given flexible budget
market, M, is feasible. We will give a characterization of feasible markets and we will derive
conditions that yield a proof of infeasibility.
Clearly, if we can find small prices p and a max-flow f in network N(p) such that the flow
gives each buyer i strictly more than ci utility, then M is feasible. We first show, using the
notion of balanced flows, that this test of feasibility is in fact a property of prices p only.
7.1 Balanced flows
We will follow the exposition in [Vaz07] and refer the reader to this chapter for all facts stated
below without proof. For simplicity, denote the current network, N(p), by simply N . Given a
feasible flow f in N , let R(f) denote the residual graph w.r.t. f . Define the surplus of buyer
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i w.r.t. flow f in network N , θi(N, f), to be the residual capacity of the edge (i, t) w.r.t. flow
f in network N , i.e., mi minus the flow sent through the edge (i, t). The surplus vector w.r.t.
flow f is defined to be θ(N, f) := (θ1(N, f), θ2(N, f), . . . , θn(N, f)). Let ‖v‖ denote the l2 norm
of vector v. A balanced flow in network N is a flow that minimizes ‖θ(N, f)‖. A balanced flow
must be a max-flow in N because augmenting a given flow can only lead to a decrease in the
l2 norm of the surplus vector.
A balanced flow in N can be computed using at most n max-flow computations. It is easy to
see that all balanced flows in N have the same surplus vector. Hence, for each buyer i, we can
define θi(N) to be the surplus of i w.r.t. any balanced flow in N ; we will shorten this to θi
when the network is understood. The key property of a balanced flow that our algorithm will
rely on is that a maximum flow f in N is balanced iff it satisfies Property 1:
Property 1: For any two buyers i and j, if θi(N, f) < θj(N, f) then there is no path from
node i to node j in R(f)− {s, t}.
Balanced flows play a crucial role in both stages of our algorithm; moreover, they have multiple
uses. In Section 8.4, after stating the full algorithm, we state the various uses of this notion.
7.2 A characterization of feasibility
Let p be small prices and let (θ1, . . . , θn) be the surplus vector of a balanced flow in N(p). We
will say that p are feasible prices if for each buyer i, θi < 1.
Lemma 7 Market M is feasible iff there are feasible prices for it.
Proof : If M is feasible, its equilibrium prices are feasible, since for each buyer i, θi = 0.
Next, assume that p are feasible prices for M. By definition, the flow sent on edge (i, t) in a
balanced flow in N(p) is
mi − θi > mi − 1 =
(
1 +
ci
γi
)
− 1 =
ci
γi
.
The utility accrued by i from this allocation is γi(mi − θi) > ci. Hence M is feasible. ✷
Observe that if a max-flow f in network N(p) gives each buyer i strictly more than ci utility,
then so will a balanced flow in N(p). Hence, feasibility is a property of prices p only.
Rather than working with θi, it will sometimes be more convenient to work with θi−1. Hence,
w.r.t. small prices p, let us define the 1-surplus of buyer i to be βi = θi− 1, where (θ1, . . . , θn)
is the surplus vector of a balanced flow in N(p). Now, another definition of feasible prices is
that they be small and for each buyer i, βi < 0.
7.3 Proof of infeasibility
We will provide two ways of establishing infeasibility of the given market. The first is via the
dual of an LP whose optimal solution tells us ifM is feasible and the second is via the dual of
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convex program (2). Given an infeasible market, Stage I of our algorithm will terminate in a
way that yields both proofs.
The game is feasible iff there is a point v ∈ N such that for each agent i ∈ B, vi > ci. In order
to capture feasibility via a linear program, let us restate as follows: the game is feasible iff
max
v∈N
min
i∈B
: (vi − ci) > 0.
Observe that the expression on the left hand side is the optimal objective function value of
LP (4). Hence, the game is feasible iff the optimal solution to LP (4) is greater than zero.
Clearly, this LP is maximizing t; however, in order to obtain a convenient dual, we will write
it as minimizing −t:
minimize −t (4)
subject to ∀i ∈ B :
∑
j∈G
uijxij ≥ ci + t
∀j ∈ G : −
∑
i∈B
xij ≥ −1
∀i ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G : xij ≥ 0
Let yi’s and zj ’s be the dual variables corresponding to the first and second set of inequalities,
respectively. The dual program is:
maximize
∑
i∈I
ciyi −
∑
j∈G
zj (5)
subject to ∀i ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G : uijyi − zj ≤ 0∑
i∈B
yi = 1
∀i ∈ B : yi ≥ 0
∀j ∈ G : zj ≥ 0
Lemma 8 If there exist prices p s.t.
∑
j∈G pj > 0 and
∑
i∈B βi ≥ 0, then the given game is
infeasible.
Proof : W.r.t. prices p, compute the maximum bang-per-buck, γi, of each buyer i. By
definition of maximum bang-per-buck,
∀i ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G : γi ≥
uij
pj
.
Let µ =
∑
i∈B 1/γi. Since
∑
j∈G pj > 0, µ > 0.
Next, consider prices q, where for each j ∈ G, qj = pj/µ. Since all the prices have been scaled
by the same factor, the network remains unchanged. Clearly, the maximum bang-per-buck of
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buyer i w.r.t. q is γ′i = µγi and
∀i ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G : γ′i ≥
uij
qj
.
Let yi = 1/γ
′
i, for i ∈ B, and zj = qj, for j ∈ G. We will show that (y, z) is a feasible solution
for the dual LP (5). The first set of inequalities is established by noting that
∀i ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G : γ′i ≥
uij
qj
hence uijyi ≤ zj .
Next we show that the equality constraint holds:
∑
i∈B
yi =
∑
i∈B
1
γ ′i
=
(
1
µ
)
·
∑
i∈B
1
γi
= 1.
Let α′i = ci/γ
′
i and let β
′
i be the 1-surplus of buyer i w.r.t. prices q. The objective function
value of the dual solution (y, z) is
∑
i∈B
ciyi −
∑
j∈G
zj =
∑
i∈B
α′i −
∑
j∈G
qj =
∑
i∈B
β′i =
(
1
µ
)
·
∑
i∈B
βi ≥ 0.
Therefore, at optimality, −t ≥ 0, i.e., t ≤ 0, hence establishing infeasibility of the game. ✷
Next, we derive a condition under which the following convex program, which is the dual of
(2), has an unbounded solution, hence proving infeasibility of the primal. This dual program
was given by Devanur [Dev10]. Its variables are qj’s and yi’s.
minimize
∑
j∈G
qj −
∑
i∈B
ciyi −
∑
i∈B
log(yi) (6)
subject to ∀i ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G : qj ≥ uijyi
Lemma 9 If there exist positive prices p such that network N(p) can be partitioned into
two, induced on (B′, G′) and ((B − B′), (G − G′)), where B′ ⊂ B and G′ ⊂ G, such that∑
i∈(B−B′) βi ≥ 0 and ∀i ∈ (B −B
′), ∀j ∈ G′ : uij = 0, then the given game is infeasible.
Proof : Observe that
∑
i∈(B−B′)
βi =

 ∑
i∈(B−B′)
θi

− |B −B′| =

 ∑
i∈(B−B′)
mi

−

 ∑
j∈(G−G′)
pj

− |B −B′|
=

 ∑
i∈(B−B′)
ci
γi

−

 ∑
j∈(G−G′)
pj

 ≥ 0.
It is easy to see that setting qj to pj and yi to 1/γi gives a feasible solution to program (6).
Multiply the prices of all goods in (G−G′) by x and let x→∞. Observe that because of the
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condition ∀i ∈ (B − B′), ∀j ∈ G′ : uij = 0, no new edges will be introduced in the network.
Hence, the updated setting of qj ’s and yi’s still yields a feasible solution to the dual.
As x→ 0, for each i ∈ (B −B′), log(γi)→ −∞. Also,
∑
j∈(G−G′) qj −
∑
i∈(B−B′) ciyi is either
0 or tends to −∞. Hence the entire objective function tends to −∞. Therefore, the dual is
unbounded and hence the primal is infeasible. ✷
8 Details of the Algorithm for ADNB
We will impose the following condition throughout; by Lemma 6, it will ensure that prices are
always small2.
Invariant: W.r.t. current prices, p, (s,B ∪G ∪ t) is a min-cut in network N(p).
It is easy to see that the prices found by Initialization satisfy the Invariant.
Let f be a balanced flow in N(p). Since the Invariant is always maintained, for each buyer i,
θi ≥ 0 and hence βi ≥ −1. In the algorithm, we will change prices of a well-chosen set J of
goods as follows. Multiply the price of each good in J by a variable x and initialize x to 1. In
Stage I, we will decrease x and in Stage II we will raise x until the next event happens.
In the next lemma, we will assume that J = G and we will study how the 1-surplus of buyers
changes as a function of x. Define x · f to be the flow obtained by multiplying by x the
flow on each edge w.r.t. f . Let βi(x) denote i’s 1-surplus w.r.t. flow x · p. Let B
′ be the
set of buyers having negative 1-surplus w.r.t. prices p. If B′ = ∅, define b = ∞ else define
b = mini∈B′{−1/βi}. Observe that in both cases, b > 1.
Lemma 10 Flow x ·f is a balanced flow in N(xp) for 0 < x ≤ b, and for each i ∈ B, βi(x) =
xβi.
Proof : Since the Invariant holds and f is a max-flow in N(p), the cut (s, J ∪ I ∪ t) is
saturated by f , and hence by x · f in N(xp). Next we show that x · f is a feasible flow in
N(xp), i.e., for each buyer i ∈ B, edge (i, t) is not over saturated. Now, βi = αi − f(i, t).
Therefore, the surplus on edge (i, t) w.r.t. flow x · f is 1 + x(αi − f(i, t)) = 1 + xβi ≥ 0 for
0 < x ≤ b. Hence, edge (i, t) is not over saturated. Furthermore, βi(x) = xβi. Finally, since f
satisfies Property 1 in N(p), x · f satisfies it in N(xp), thereby showing that it is a balanced
flow. ✷
8.1 Details of Stage I
Algorithm 1 gives the pseudo code for Stage I. In this section, we give the subroutines used by
this stage and Section 8.3 gives formal definitions of the predicates used in the While loops. A
2The following power point presentations may make the algorithm easier to understand:
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ vazirani/Waterloo1.ppt
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ vazirani/Waterloo2.ppt
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run of Stage I is partitioned into phases, which are further partitioned into iterations. In Stage
I, an iteration ends when a new edge is added to the network. A phase ends either when the
condition of Step 7 holds or if for some i ∈ I, βi ≥ 0. In each iteration, the algorithm computes
a balanced flow in the current network, N(p).
We establish the following notation. For J ⊆ G, define p(J) =
∑
j∈J pj and Γ(J) = {i ∈
B | ∃j ∈ J s.t. (j, i) ∈ N(p)}. Similarly, for I ⊆ B, define α(I) =
∑
i∈I αi, m(I) =
∑
i∈I mi
and Γ(I) = {j ∈ G | ∃i ∈ B s.t. (j, i) ∈ N(p)}.
The sets Bc and Gc denote the current sets of buyers and goods being considered by the
algorithm. These sets are initialized to B and G, respectively. At any point the algorithm,
B = Bc ∪ B
′ and G = Gc ∪ G
′, where B′ and G′ are the sets of adaptable buyers and goods,
respectively; their purpose is explained below. B′ and G′ are both initialized to ∅. As the
algorithm proceeds, buyers are moved from Bc to B
′ and goods are moved from Gc to G
′.
The subroutines used in Stage I are:
• Find sets(I): Sets I ⊆ Bc and J ⊆ Gc are initialized as follows.
I ← arg min
i∈Bc
{βi} and J ← (Γ(I)− Γ(Bc − I)).
Observe that J consists of goods that are the maximum bang-per-buck goods of buyers
in I only. All edges from goods in Gc − J to buyers in I are removed; this is justified in
Lemma 15 below.
• Update sets(I): Find the set, I ′, of all buyers in Bc − I such that there is a residual
path from a buyer in I to a buyer in I ′. Update
I ← (I ∪ I ′) and J ← (Γ(I)− Γ(Bc − I)).
All edges from goods in Gc − J to buyers in I are removed. Once again, this is justified
in Lemma 15.
Assume that (j, i), j ∈ J, i ∈ (Bc − I) is the new edge added to Si in the current iteration.
Observe that if I ′ = ∅, then all the flow from j, which was going to buyers in I before the
addition of this edge, must go to i, since there is no residual path from I to i. Accordingly,
Update sets(I) will move good j from J to Gc − J . As soon as the prices of goods in J are
reduced by an infinitesimally small amount (by decreasing x) buyers in I will not be interested
in good j anymore.
Lemma 11 In Stage I, at the start of each iteration, for each buyer i ∈ I there is a good j ∈ J
such that edge (j, i) is in the network.
Proof : Since βi < 0, the balanced flow must be sending flow on some edge (j, i). If an edge
(j, i′) to a buyer i′ ∈ (Bc − I) is also present in the network, then there will be a residual path
from i to i′, violating Property 1. Therefore, there is no such edge and j ∈ (Γ(I)−Γ(Bc− I)),
proving the lemma. ✷
17
We now explain the purpose of the sets B′ and G′. Once a good is moved into G′, its price
gets frozen until the end of Stage I. At any point in Stage I, these sets satisfy the following
properties:
1. W.r.t. the frozen prices of goods in G′, for each buyer i ∈ B′, βi < 0.
2. Buyers in B are totally uninterested in goods in G′ at any price, i.e., for every i ∈ B and
every j ∈ G′, uij = 0. Hence, as prices of goods in G
′ are decreased, no edge from B to
G′ will ever enter the network.
The reason for the name “adaptable” is that as far as determining feasibility or infeasibility
goes, buyers in B′ can be made consistent with the outcome of the remaining buyers. Thus,
if ∀i ∈ Bc, βi < 0, by assigning the frozen goods in G
′ their prices at the time of freezing, we
can ensure that ∀i ∈ B, βi < 0. The resulting price vector is clearly feasible. In Step 9 in
Algorithm 1 we have refer to this process as “restoring prices of adjustable goods.”
If on the other hand
∑
i∈Bc
βi ≥ 0, then we can give a proof of infeasibility in one of two ways.
First, by lowering the prices of all goods in G′ to zero, which can be done without introducing
any new edges in the network, we can ensure that ∀i ∈ B′, βi = 0, thereby ensuring that these
buyers don’t affect the sum of βi’s. The conditions of Lemma 8 now hold and yield a proof of
infeasibility. Second, by assigning the frozen goods in G′ their prices at the time of freezing,
we can ensure that the prices of all goods are positive and the conditions of Lemma 9 now
hold to yield a different proof of infeasibility.
At the start of a phase, the set I ⊆ Bc of buyers having the smallest β values is identified.
The goods they desire are put in set J . If at any point, I and J are found to be adaptable,
the algorithm updates B′ and G′ and the phase comes to an end. Otherwise, the algorithm
lowers the prices of goods in J until a new edge (j, i), with j ∈ J and i ∈ (Bc − I) is added to
the network. On recomputing a balanced flow, either βi becomes negative, if so i moves into I
and the iteration comes to an end, or for some buyer(s) i′ ∈ I, βi′ increases. If for some buyer
i ∈ I, βi becomes non-negative, the phase comes to an end. Lemma 12 shows that eventually,
either all buyers are rendered good or the conditions of Lemma 8 start holding. In the former
case, the frozen prices of goods in G′ are restored and the algorithm moves on to Stage II to
find equilibrium prices.
One way to view the operation of Stage I is as a tug-of-war between two sets of buyers: the
good buyers and the rest. The algorithm decreases the prices of goods desired by buyers in
I, thereby increasing their βi’s. This helps towards reaching the infeasibility condition stated
above. However, as new edges enter the network and a balanced flow is recomputed, buyers
may move between the 2 sets.
Observe that in each iteration, the algorithm needs to compute the largest value of x at which
a new edge is added to the network. For any one edge this is straightforward; taking the
maximum over all relevant edges gives the required value.
Lemma 12 Stage I must terminate with either a feasible price vector or a proof of infeasibility.
Proof : By Lemma 25, Stage I must terminate. If at this point, ∀i ∈ B : βi < 0, a feasible
price vector has been found. Otherwise,
∑
i∈Bc
βi ≥ 0 and hence ∃i ∈ Bc : βi ≥ 0. This
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buyer must be in Bc − I, since all buyers in I satisfy βi < 0, and the goods this buyer desires
must have positive prices. Now, the conditions of Lemma 8 can be made to hold by setting
the prices of goods in G′ to zero. ✷
8.2 Details of Stage II
Algorithm 2 gives the pseudo code for Stage II. In this section, we give the subroutines used
by this stage and Section 8.3 gives formal definitions of the predicates used in the While
loops. If Stage I terminates with a feasible price vector p, the algorithm moves to Stage II
to find equilibrium prices. Since p is small, Stage II needs to raise prices of goods to get to
the equilibrium. Another way to view the situation is that since buyers have surplus money,
Stage II needs to change prices in such a way that the surplus drops to zero. Are both
these requirements compatible, i.e., will the surplus of buyers decrease by raising prices? The
following lemma clarifies this crucial point in the simplified setting of Lemma 10, i.e., prices of
all goods are raised; of course, Stage II will raise the prices of well-chosen subsets of G.
Lemma 13 If in the setting of Lemma 10, prices p are feasible and x is raised without violating
the Invariant, then the surplus of each buyer decreases and the resulting price vector is still
feasible.
Proof : Since p is feasible, for each buyer i, βi < 0. Clearly, if x > 1, x · βi < βi, i.e. the
surplus of buyer i decreases. Moreover, the property that the β of each buyer is negative is
preserved. Hence the resulting price vector is still feasible. ✷
A run of Stage II is also partitioned into phases, which are further partitioned into iterations.
An iteration ends when a new edge is added to the network and a phase ends when a new
set goes tight. We will say that S ⊆ G is a tight set if the total price of goods in S exactly
equals the money possessed by buyers who are interested in goods in S, i.e., p(S) = m(Γ(S)).
Clearly, if S is tight, buyers in Γ(S) must have zero surplus and hence have βi = −1. In each
iteration, the algorithm computes a balanced flow in the current network, N(p).
The subroutines used in Stage II are:
• Find sets(II): Sets I ⊆ B and J ⊆ G are initialized as follows.
I ← argmax
i∈B
{θi} and J ← Γ(I).
All edges are removed from goods in J to buyers in B − I; this is justified in Lemma 15
below.
• Update sets(II): Find the set, I ′, of all buyers in B − I that have residual paths to
buyers in I. Update
I ← (I ∪ I ′) and J ← Γ(I).
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All edges are removed from goods in J to buyers in B − I. Once again, this is justified
in Lemma 15.
Observe that if (j, i) is the new edge added to Si, then good j must move from G − J to J ,
whether or not I ′ = ∅. The choice of set J above ensures that if the prices of goods in J are
increased by an infinitesimally small amount (by increasing x as stated in Algorithm 2), there
is no change in the maximum bang-per-buck goods of buyers in B.
Lemma 14 In Stage II, at the start of each iteration, for each buyer i ∈ (B − I) there is a
good j ∈ (G − J) such that edge (j, i) is in the network.
Proof : Since θi < 1, the balanced flow must be sending flow on some edge (j, i). If j ∈ J ,
then there will be a residual path from i to a buyer in I, violating Property 1. Therefore,
j ∈ (G− J). ✷
Lemma 15 In Stage I (Stage II), the Invariant holds after all edges from goods in G− J (J)
to buyers in I (B − I) are removed.
Proof : The idea of the proof is the same for both statements. In Stage I, right after
Update sets(I) is executed, there are no residual paths from I to B − I. Therefore, by
Property 1, any edges from G− J to I could not be carrying any flow and hence their removal
will not affect the Invariant.
In Stage II, right after Update sets(II) is executed, there are no residual paths from B − I
to I. Therefore, by Property 1, any edges from J to B− I could not be carrying any flow and
hence their removal will not affect the Invariant. ✷
In each iteration, we need to compute the smallest value of x at which a new edge is added to
the network or a new set goes tight. The former computation is the same as in Stage I. Let
the smallest value of x at which a new set goes tight be x∗. Let b = mini∈I
{
− 1βi
}
. Clearly,
b > 1. Using Lemma 10, proved in Section 7, for x in the range 1 ≤ x ≤ b, we prove below
that x∗ = b.
Lemma 16 x∗ = b.
Proof : By definition of b, for 1 ≤ x < b, for each i ∈ I, the surplus of i will be 1+xβi > 0,
since xβi > −1. Thus, each edge (i, t) will have positive surplus, implying that there are no
tight sets.
Next, assume that x = b. Let
T =
{
i ∈ I | −
1
βi
= b
}
and S = {j ∈ J | f(j, i) > 0, for some i ∈ T}.
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Since f is a balanced flow in N(p), there cannot be an edge (j, i) for j ∈ S and i ∈ (I − T ) in
N(p). This is so because otherwise there would be a path from T to i in the residual graph,
contradicting Property 1 (observe that βi < −1/b). Therefore, Γ(S) = T . Moreover, for i ∈ T ,
the surplus on edge (i, t) w.r.t. flow x · f in N(xp) is 1 + x(−1/b) = 0. Hence S is a tight set
in network N(xp) for x = b. ✷
8.3 Predicates used in While loops
In Step 2 (Stage I), “a proof of feasibility is reached” when ∀i ∈ B, βi < 0, and “a proof of
infeasibility is reached” when
∑
i∈B βi ≥ 0. Thus “a proof of feasibility or infeasibility is not
reached” is satisfied iff ¬((
∑
i∈B βi ≥ 0) ∨ (∀i ∈ B, βi < 0)).
In Step 4 (Stage I), “B − I desire J” is satisfied iff ∃i ∈ (B − I), ∃j ∈ J : uij > 0, and
“buyers in I have small surplus” is satisfied iff ∀i ∈ I, βi < 0.
In Step 1, “a buyer in B has surplus money” is satisfied iff ∃i ∈ B, θi > 0).
In Step 3, “no set in J is tight” is satisfied iff ¬(∃S, ∅ ⊂ S ⊆ J s.t. S is tight).
8.4 The role of balanced flow
Besides being used for defining the central notion of feasible prices, balanced flow plays the
following three, rather diverse, crucial roles in both stages of our algorithm.
1. Ensure that edges, that need to be removed as prices of goods in J are raised, did not
carry any flow and hence their removal would not violate the Invariant; this is argued in
Lemma 15
2. Ensure that in each iteration, buyers entering I in Stage I (Stage II) have sufficiently
large |βi| (|θi|); this is established in Lemma 21 (Lemma 31).
3. Prove that sufficient progress is made in an iteration and hence in a phase. This is
established in Lemma 22 for Stage I and Lemma 32 for Stage II.
As stated in the Introduction, balanced flow could have been defined without resorting to the
l2 norm – as a max-flow that makes the surplus vector lexicographically smallest, after its
components are sorted in decreasing order (and hence making the components as balanced
as possible). It is easy to prove Property 1 with this definition as well. The first two roles
listed above make use of Property 1 only. On the other hand, the third role uses the definition
of balanced flow via the l2 norm and as argued in Section 11, the use of the l2 norm seems
indispensable.
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Algorithm 1 (Initialization and Stage I of the Algorithm for ADNB)
1. Initialization:
(i) ∀i ∈ B : mi ← 1.
(ii) Use the DPSV algorithm to compute equilibrium prices, p.
(iii) ∀i ∈ B : mi ← 1 +
ci
γi
.
(iv) Bc ← B; Gc ← G.
(v) B′ ← ∅; G′ ← ∅.
(vi) Compute a balanced flow in N(p).
Stage I
2. (New Phase) While a proof of feasibility or infeasibility is not reached do:
3. Find sets(I).
4. (New Iteration) While Bc − I desire J and buyers in I have small surplus do:
5. Multiply the prices of goods in J and α’s of buyers in I by x.
Initialize x← 1, and decrease x continuously until:
A new edge (j, i) enters Si, for j ∈ J and i ∈ (Bc − I).
Add (j, i) to N(p) and compute a balanced flow in it.
Update sets(I).
6. End (End Iteration)
7. If ∀i ∈ (Bc − I), ∀j ∈ J : uij = 0, then:
Declare I and J adaptable, i.e,,
G′ ← (G′ ∪ J) and Gc ← (Gc − J).
B′ ← (B′ ∪ I) and Bc ← (Bc − I).
8. End (End Phase)
9. If ∀i ∈ Bc, βi < 0, then:
Restore prices of adaptable goods in G′.
Compute a balanced flow in N(p).
Go to Step 1 in Stage II.
10. Else (i.e.,
∑
i∈Bc
βi ≥ 0), output “The game is infeasible”.
HALT.
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Algorithm 2 (Stage II of the Algorithm for ADNB)
1. (New Phase) While a buyer in B has surplus money do:
2. Find sets(II).
3. (New Iteration) While no set in J is tight do:
4. Multiply prices of goods in J and α’s of buyers in I by x.
Initialize x← 1, and raise x continuously until:
A new edge (j, i) enters Si, for j ∈ (G− J) and i ∈ I.
If so, add (j, i) to N(p) and compute a balanced flow in it.
Update sets(II).
5. End (End Iteration)
6. End (End Phase)
7. Output the current allocations and prices.
HALT.
9 Running Time Analysis
We first define some parameters of the given problem instance. Recall that g = |G| and
n = |B|. Let U = maxi∈B,j∈G{uij}, C = maxi∈B ci, and ∆ = nCU
n. Observe that program
(2) with all ci = 0 is the same as the convex program for a linear Fisher market with all buyers
having unit money. Hence, Theorem 2 gives a lower bound on the price of a good computed
in Initialization. Let this lower bound be 1/µ, µ ∈ Z+.
The following enhanced version of Lemma 10 will be needed in both stages.
Lemma 17 Let f be a balanced flow in network N(p). Then, for 0 < x ≤ b, the flow x · f is
a balanced flow in N(xp).
Proof : For i, j ∈ B assume that 1 + xβi < 1 + xβj. Since x > 0, 1 + βi < 1 + βj , i.e.,
w.r.t. flow f in N(p), the surplus of i is smaller than that of j. Since f is a balanced flow in
N(p), by Property 1, there is no path from i to j in the residual graph. Therefore, w.r.t. flow
x · f in N(xp) also there is no path from i to j in the residual graph. Therefore, flow x · f in
N(xp) satisfies Property 1 and hence is a balanced flow. ✷
9.1 Stage I
Throughout Stage I, we will consider a partitioning of Bc into two sets, B1 and B2, containing
buyers having βi < 0 and βi ≥ 0, respectively. For Stage I, we will work with the following
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potential function:
Φ =
∑
i∈B1
β2i .
As Stage I proceeds, buyers move from Bc to B
′, and within Bc between the sets B1 and B2.
For this reason, it will be convenient to define Φ using an n-dimensional vector, ψ, called the
associated vector of network N . The i-th component of this vector, ψi, is βi for i ∈ B1, and is
0 for i ∈ (B′ ∪B2). Hence, an alternative definition for the potential function is:
Φ = ‖ψ‖2.
Lemma 18 In Stage I, a phase consists of at most ng iterations.
Proof : Observe that if inUpdate sets(I), I ′ = ∅, then a good must move from J to Gc−J .
Otherwise, a buyer must move from Bc − I to I. Clearly, there can be at most |J | < |Gc|
contiguous iterations of the first type and a total of at most |Bc − I0| < |Bc| iterations of the
second type, where I0 is the set I at the start of the phase. ✷
The central fact established below is that Φ drops by a factor of (1 − 1/(gn2)) in a phase
(Lemma 23). Towards this end, assume that a given phase consists of k iterations. Let I0
denote set I at the start of the phase and let Il denote the set I at the end of the l-th iteration,
1 ≤ l ≤ k. Assume that at the start of this phase, maxi∈B1{|βi|} = δ = δ0. Let
δl = min
i∈Il
{|βi|}, for 1 ≤ l < k, and δk = 0.
As we will see in this section, the potential function Φ drops monotonically in each iteration
in the phase. Within an iteration, we will account for the drop in two steps. First, as prices of
goods in J are reduced, by Lemma 10 the βi’s of buyers i ∈ I increase, leading to a reduction
in Φ. Second, when a new edge (j, i), with j ∈ J and i ∈ (Bc − I), is added to the network,
the flow becomes more balanced, leading to a further drop. We will account for these two
reductions separately, via different arguments (see Lemma 22). For the first step, we work
with the l1 norm, establishing an increase in
∑
i∈B1
βi. In the second step,
∑
i∈B1
βi will not
change if i ∈ (B1 − I). Instead, we establish a decrease in ‖ψ‖
2 using an l2 norm based
argument. We observe that the latter argument is difficult to apply to the first step since the
money of buyers changes as prices change. Also, we do not know of a simple one step argument
that accounts for the entire reduction in an iteration.
Next, we prove a key fact that accounts for the second decrease. Just before new edge (j, i)
is added to Si, let N be the network and p be the prices of goods. Let N
′ be the network
obtained by adding this edge to N ; of course, the prices remain unchanged. Let f and f∗ be
balanced flows in N and N ′, respectively, and let ψi and ψ
∗
i be their associated vectors.
Lemma 19 ‖ψ‖2 − ‖ψ∗‖2 ≥
∑
h∈B1
(ψh − ψ
∗
h)
2.
Proof : Since the Invariant holds and the prices are unchanged, f and f∗ have the same
value. Therefore, flow f∗ − f will consist of circulations. Since f is a balanced flow, all these
24
circulations must use the edge (j, i), because otherwise a circulation not using edge (j, i) could
be used for making f more balanced. These circulations will have the effect of increasing
the surplus of certain buyers in I, say il, for 1 ≤ l ≤ k, and decreasing the surplus of buyer
i ∈ (Bc − I). Let βi − β
∗
i = δ, and for 1 ≤ l ≤ k, β
∗
il
− βil = δl. Then,
∑k
l=1 δl = δ.
For each buyer il, 1 ≤ il ≤ k, there is a path from il to i in the corresponding circulation and
hence there is a path from i to il in the residual graph w.r.t. flow f
∗. Since f∗ is balanced, by
Property 1, the surplus of buyer i is at least as large as that of il. Therefore, β
∗
i ≥ β
∗
il
.
In going from N to N ′, the ψh values can change only for h = i, and h = il, for 1 ≤ l ≤ k. We
will consider 3 cases.
Case 1: βi ≥ 0, i.e., i ∈ B2, and β
∗
i ≥ 0.
In this case, ψi = ψ
∗
i = 0 and the lemma is obvious.
Case 2: βi ≥ 0, i.e., i ∈ B2, and β
∗
i < 0.
Let a = −β∗i . In this case, ψi = 0 and ψ
∗
i = −a.
Clearly, a ≤
∑k
l=1 δl Since β
∗
i ≥ β
∗
il
, a ≤ bl − δl. Now,
‖ψ‖2 − ‖ψ∗‖2 =
(
02 +
k∑
l=1
b2l
)
−
(
a2 +
k∑
l=1
(bl − δl)
2
)
= −a2 +
k∑
l=1
(2bl − δl)δl
≥ −a2 +
k∑
l=1
(2a+ δl)δl ≥ −a
2 +
k∑
l=1
δ2l + 2a
k∑
l=1
δl ≥
k∑
l=1
δ2l ,
where the first inequality follows from a ≤ bl − δl and the third one follows from a ≤
∑k
l=1 δl.
Case 3: β∗i < 0, i.e., i ∈ (B1 − I).
Clearly, in this case, βi < 0. Substitute a = −βi, and for 1 ≤ il ≤ k, substitute bl = −βil .
Now, by Lemma 20, to get ‖ψ‖2 − ‖ψ∗‖2 ≥ δ2. Clearly, δ2 ≥
∑k
l=1 δ
2
l , giving the lemma. ✷
Lemma 20 Let δ, δl ≥ 0, l = 1, 2, . . . , k, with δ =
∑k
l=1 δl. If a+ δ ≤ bl− δl, for l = 1, 2, . . . , k
then
‖(a, b1, b2, . . . , bk)‖
2 − ‖(a+ δ, b1 − δ1, b2 − δ2, . . . , bk − δk)‖
2 ≥ δ2.
Proof :(
a2 +
k∑
l=1
bl
2
)
−
(
(a+ δ)2 +
k∑
l=1
(bl − δl)
2
)
≥
(
(a+ δ − δ)2 +
k∑
l=1
(bl − δl + δl)
2
)
−
(
(a+ δ)2 +
k∑
l=1
(bl − δl)
2
)
≥ δ2 + 2(a+ δ)
(
(
k∑
l=1
δl)− δ
)
≥ δ2.
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✷Let ψ0 denote vector ψ at the start of the phase and ψl denote ψ at the end of iteration l, for
1 ≤ l ≤ k.
Lemma 21 In the l-th iteration, there is a buyer i ∈ Il−1 such that |βi| decreases by at least
(δl−1 − δl), for 1 ≤ l < k.
Proof : By the definition of set I ′ in procedure Update sets(I) and Property 1, there is
a buyer i ∈ Il−1 which achieves mini∈Il{|βi|} at the end of iteration l. Clearly, βi increases
(and hence |βi| decreases) by at least (δl−1 − δl) in the l-th iteration. ✷
Lemma 22 For 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
‖ψl−1‖2 − ‖ψl‖2 ≥ (δl−1 − δl)
2.
Proof : We first prove the statement for 1 ≤ l < k. By Lemma 21, there is a buyer i ∈ Il−1
such that βi increases by at least (δl−1− δl) in the l-th iteration. Let us split this increase into
two parts, the increase due to decrease in the prices of goods in J and that due to a new edge
entering the network. Let these be a and b, respectively. Therefore, a+ b = δl−1 − δl.
Let ψ′ be the vector ψ just before the new edge is added to the network in iteration l, i.e.,
right after all the decrease in prices of J has happened. As prices in J decrease, the beta’s of
buyers in I increase, each leading to a decrease in ‖ψ′‖2; clearly, the beta’s of buyers in Bc− I
remain unchanged. Let c be the value of beta of buyer i at the beginning of iteration l. Then,
‖ψl−1‖2 − ‖ψ′‖2 ≥ c2 − (c+ a)2 = a2 − 2ac.
By Lemma 19,
‖ψ′‖2 − ‖ψl‖2 ≥ b2.
Adding the two we get
‖ψl−1‖2 − ‖ψl‖2 ≥ a2 − 2ac+ b2 ≥ (δ′ + δ′′)2 ≥ (δl−1 − δl)
2,
where the second last inequality follows from the observation that b ≤ −c.
Finally, in the k-th iteration, there is a buyer i ∈ Ik−1 whose ψi changes from βi < 0 to 0.
Therefore,
‖ψk−1‖2 − ‖ψk‖2 ≥ β2i ≥ (δk−1 − δk)
2,
since δk−1 ≤ −βi and δk = 0. ✷
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Lemma 23 In a phase in Stage I, the potential drops by a factor of
(
1−
1
n2g
)
.
Proof : Now, ‖ψ0‖2−‖ψk‖2 can be written as a telescoping sum of k terms, each of which is
the decrease in the potential in one of the k iterations. Lemma 22 gives a lower bound on each
of these terms. The total lower bound is minimized when each of the differences (δl−1 − δl) is
equal. Now using the fact that δ0 = δ and δk = 0, we get:
‖ψ0‖2 − ‖ψk‖2 ≥
δ2
k
.
Finally, since ‖ψ0‖2 ≤ nδ2, and by Lemma 18 k ≤ ng, we get:
‖ψk‖2 ≤ ‖ψ0‖2
(
1−
1
n2g
)
.
✷
Lemma 24 At any point in Stage I, if
∑
i∈B2
βi > 0, then
∑
i∈B2
βi ≥
1
Unµg
.
Proof : First observe that the maximum bang-per-buck of buyers in B2 remains unchanged
throughout Stage I, and is determined by prices of goods found in the Initialization. Let
J2 = Γ(B2). By Property 1, there is no flow from a good in J2 to a buyer in B1, and therefore,
all flow from J2 must go to buyers in B2. Therefore,∑
i∈B2
βi =
∑
i∈B2
θi − |B2| =
∑
i∈B2
αi −
∑
j∈J2
pj.
Now if
∑
i∈B2
βi > 0, then the denominator of this sum is a product of at most n uij ’s and at
most g pj’s, and is therefore bounded by U
nµg, proving the lemma. ✷
Lemma 25 The execution of Stage I requires at most
O
(
n4g2(n logU + g log µ)
)
max-flow computations.
Proof : By Lemma 23, the square of the potential drops by a factor of two after O(n2g)
phases. At the start of the algorithm, the potential is at most n.
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If at any point,
∑
i∈B2
βi = 0, i.e., ∀i ∈ B2 : βi = 0, each subsequent phase must end up in
Step 5 and not Step 6, i.e., some buyers will be removed from consideration. Therefore, from
this point on, at most n more phases are needed for Stage I to terminate.
Next, let’s assume that
∑
i∈B2
βi > 0 throughout Stage I. If so, by Lemma 24, once the potential
drops below 1
(Unµg)2
, the phase must end (in Step 7). Therefore the number of phases is
O(n2g log(U2nµ2g)).
By Lemma 18 each phase consists of at most ng iterations and each iteration requires n max-
flow computations for finding a balanced flow. The lemma follows. ✷
9.2 Stage II
When ∀i ∈ B : βi < 0, the algorithm starts with Stage II. Since in this stage the algorithm
only raises prices of goods (i.e., increases x), by Lemma 13, ∀i ∈ B : βi < 0 holds until
termination.
In this section, we will work with the θi’s of buyers, rather than their βi’s. Thus, throughout
Stage II, ∀i ∈ B : θi < 1. For Stage II, we will work with the following potential function:
Φ =
∑
i∈B
θ2i .
Lemma 26 In Stage II, at the termination of a phase, the prices of goods in the newly tight
set must be rational numbers with denominator ≤ ∆.
Proof : Let S be the newly tight set. Consider the subgraph of the network induced on the
bipartition (S,Γ(S)), and view this as an undirected graph, say H. Assume w.l.o.g. that this
graph is connected (otherwise we prove the lemma for each connected component of H). Pick
a spanning tree in H.
Pick any good j ∈ S, and find a path in the spanning tree from j to each good j′ ∈ S. If j
reaches j′ with a path of length 2l, then pj′ = apj/b where a and b are products of l utility
parameters (uik’s) each. Since alternate edges of this path contribute to a and b, we can
partition the uik’s of edges in the spanning tree into two sets, T1 and T2, such that a uses uik’s
from T1 and b uses those from T2.
Next, consider αi = ci/γi, for i ∈ Γ(S). Now, γi = ui,j′/pj′ , where (i, j
′) is any edge in the
network. Find the path in the spanning tree from i to j and use the first edge on this path for
computing γi (it is easy to see that all these edges come from set T2), and substitute pj′ using
the expression stated above, i.e., pj′ = apj/b.
Since S is a tight set,
∑
j′∈S
pj′ =
∑
i∈Γ(S)
1 + αi.
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In this equation, substitute for pj′ and αi using the expressions constructed above to get an
equation with one variable, i.e., pj. Now, it is easy to see that the denominator of pj is ≤ ∆.
✷
Lemma 27 In Stage II, consider two phases P and P ′, not necessarily consecutive, such that
good j lies in the newly tight sets at the end of P as well as P ′. Then the increase in the price
of j, going from P to P ′, is at least 1/∆2.
Proof : Let the prices of j at the end of P and P ′ be p/q and r/s, respectively. Clearly,
r/s > p/q. By Lemma 26, q ≤ ∆ and r ≤ ∆. Therefore the increase in price of j,
r
s
−
p
q
≥
1
∆2
.
✷
Lemma 28 In Stage II, a phase consists of at most g iterations.
Proof : After each iteration, other than the last one, at least one good will move from G−J
to J . ✷
The structure of the rest of the argument is quite similar to that of Stage I. Once again, the
central fact established is that Φ drops by an inverse polynomial factor, of (1 − 1/n2), in a
phase (Lemma 33). Assume that a given phase consists of k iterations. Let I0 denote set I at
the start of the phase and let Il denote the set I at the end of the l-th iteration, 1 ≤ l ≤ k.
Assume that at the start of this phase, maxi∈B{|θi|} = δ = δ0. Let
δl = min
i∈Il
{|θi|}, for 1 ≤ l < k, and θk = 0.
As in Stage I, we will account for the drop in Φ in two steps in each iteration. First, as prices
of goods in J are increased, the θi’s of buyers i ∈ I decrease, leading to a reduction in Φ.
Second, when a new edge (j, i), with j ∈ (Gc − J) and i ∈ I, is added to the network, the flow
becomes more balanced, leading to a further drop. As in Stage I, we will account for the first
drop using the l1 norm and the second drop using the l2 norm.
We begin by accounting for the second decrease. Just before new edge (j, i) is added, let N
be the network and p be the prices of goods. Let N ′ be the network obtained by adding this
edge to N ; of course, the prices remain unchanged. Let f and f∗ be balanced flows in N and
N ′, respectively. Denote by θ (θ∗) the surplus vector w.r.t. flow f in N (flow f∗ in N ′).
Lemma 29 ‖θ‖2 − ‖θ∗‖2 ≥ δ2, where δ = θi − θ
∗
i .
Proof : Since the Invariant holds and the prices are unchanged, f and f∗ have the same
value. Therefore, flow f∗ − f will consist of circulations. Since f is a balanced flow, all these
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circulations must use the edge (j, i), because otherwise a circulation not using edge (j, i) could
be used for making f more balanced. These circulations will have the effect of decreasing the
surplus of buyer i ∈ I, and increasing the surplus of buyers il ∈ (B − I), for 1 ≤ l ≤ k. Let
θ∗il − θil = δl, for 1 ≤ l ≤ k. Then,
∑k
l=1 δl = δ.
For each buyer il, 1 ≤ il ≤ k, there is a path from il to i in the corresponding circulation and
hence there is a path from i to il in the residual graph w.r.t. flow f
∗. Since f∗ is balanced, by
Property 1, the surplus of buyer i w.r.t. f∗ is at least as large as that of il. Therefore, θ
∗
i ≥ θ
∗
il
.
The inequality ‖θ‖2 −‖θ∗‖2 ≥ δ2 now follows from Lemma 30, on substituting a = θ∗i , and for
1 ≤ l ≤ k, bl = θ
∗
il
. ✷
Lemma 30 If a ≥ bl ≥ 0, l = 1, 2, . . . , k and δ =
∑k
l=1 δl where δ, δl ≥ 0, l = 1, 2, . . . , k, then
‖(a+ δ, b1 − δ1, b2 − δ2, . . . , bk − δk)‖
2 − ‖(a, b1, b2, . . . , bk)‖
2 ≥ δ2.
Proof :
(a+ δ)2 +
k∑
i=1
(bi − δi)
2 − a2 −
k∑
i=1
bi
2 ≥ δ2 + 2a(δ −
k∑
i=1
δi) ≥ δ
2.
✷
Let θ0 denote the surplus vector at the start of the phase and let θl denote the surplus vector
at the end of iteration l, for 1 ≤ l ≤ k.
Lemma 31 In the l-th iteration, there is a buyer i ∈ Il−1 whose surplus decreases by at least
(δl−1 − δl), for 1 ≤ l < k.
Proof : By the definition of set I ′ in procedure Update sets(II) and Property 1, there is
a buyer i ∈ Il−1 which achieves mini∈Il{|θi|} at the end of iteration l. Clearly, the surplus of
i decreases by at least (δl−1 − δl) in the l-th iteration. ✷
Lemma 32 For 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
‖θl−1‖2 − ‖θl‖2 ≥ (δl−1 − δl)
2.
Proof : We first prove the statement for 1 ≤ l < k. By Lemma 31, there is a buyer i ∈ Il−1
whose surplus decreases by at least (δl−1 − δl) in the l-th iteration. Let us split this decrease
into two parts, the decrease due to increase in the prices of goods in J and that due to a new
edge entering the network. Let these be a and b, respectively. Clearly, a+ b ≥ δl−1 − δl.
Let θ′ be the surplus vector just before the new edge is added to the network in iteration l, i.e.,
right after all the increase in prices of J has happened. As prices in J increase, the surpluses
of buyers in I decrease, but those of buyers in B − I remain unchanged. Let c be the surplus
of buyer i at the beginning of iteration l. Then,
‖θl−1‖2 − ‖θ′‖2 ≥ c2 − (c− a)2 ≥ a2 + 2ac.
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By Lemma 29,
‖θ′‖2 − ‖θl‖2 ≥ b2.
Adding the two we get
‖θl−1‖2 − ‖θl‖2 ≥ a2 + 2ac+ b2 ≥ (a+ b)2 ≥ (δl−1 − δl)
2,
where the second last inequality follows from the observation that b ≤ c.
Finally, in the k-th iteration, there is a buyer i ∈ Ik−1 whose surplus changes from θi > 0 to
0. Therefore,
‖θk−1‖2 − ‖θk‖2 ≥ θ2i ≥ (δk−1 − δk)
2,
since δk−1 ≤ θi and δk = 0. ✷
Lemma 33 In a phase in Stage II, the potential drops by a factor of
(
1−
1
n2
)
.
Proof : Now, ‖θ0‖2−‖θk‖2 can be written as a telescoping sum of k terms, each of which is
the decrease in the potential in one of the k iterations. Lemma 32 gives a lower bound on each
of these terms. The total lower bound is minimized when each of the differences (δl−1 − δl) is
equal. Now using the fact that δ0 = δ and δk = 0, we get:
‖θ0‖2 − ‖θk‖2 ≥
δ2
k
.
Finally, since ‖θ0‖2 ≤ nδ2, and by Lemma 28 k ≤ n, we get:
‖θk‖2 ≤ ‖θ0‖2
(
1−
1
n2
)
.
✷
Lemma 34 The execution of Stage II requires at most
O
(
n4(log n+ n logU + logC)
)
max-flow computations.
Proof : By Lemma 33, the potential drops by a factor of half after O(n2) phases. At
the start of the algorithm, the potential is at most n. Once its value drops below 1/∆4, the
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algorithm requires at most n more phases to compute equilibrium prices. This follows from
Lemma 26 and Lemma 27. Therefore the number of phases is
O(n2 log(∆4n)) = O(n2(log n+ n logU + logC)).
By Lemma 28 each phase consists of n iterations and each iteration requires n max-flow
computations for computing a balanced flow. The lemma follows. ✷
Lemmas 25 and 34 give:
Theorem 35 Algorithms 1 and 2 solve the decision and search versions of Nash bargaining
game ADNB using
O
(
n4g(log n+ n logU + logC + g log µ)
)
max-flow computations.
10 Postmortem and Was Stage I Really Needed?
As pointed out in Section 4 in [DPSV08], the primal-dual paradigm operates in a fundamentally
different way in the setting of a rational convex program than in the setting of an integral linear
program. In the latter setting, in each iteration, it picks an unsatisfied complementary slackness
condition and satisfies it. On the other hand, in the former setting, the algorithm starts off
with a suboptimal solution that can be viewed as relaxing a class of the KKT conditions. It
then tightens these conditions gradually; when they are all fully tightened, the optimal solution
has been reached.
Let us first show that this high level picture applies to Stage II of our algorithm as well.
Consider the situation right after a balanced flow has been computed at any point in Stage II,
and consider an arbitrary buyer i. At this point, let fi be the flow sent on edge (i, t) by the
balanced flow; fi is also the money spent by i in the current allocation. Buyer i’s available
money at this point is mi = 1 + ci/γi. Therefore,
fi = mi − βi − 1 =
ci
γi
− βi.
Let vi be the total utility derived by i from the current allocation and suppose that xij > 0.
Then,
γi =
uij
pj
=
vi
fi
=
vi
(−βi) +
ci
γi
.
This yields
(
(−βi) +
ci
γi
)
γi = vi ⇒ γi =
vi − ci
(−βi)
.
32
Substituting for γi and rearranging we get
pj
(−βi)
=
uij
vi − ci
.
To summarize, at any point in Stage II, we have ensured the first two KKT conditions and
relaxed the last two as follows:
(1) ∀j ∈ G : pj ≥ 0.
(2) ∀j ∈ G : pj > 0 ⇒
∑
i∈B xij = 1.
(3’) ∀i ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G :
pj
−βi
≥
uij
vi−ci
.
(4’) ∀i ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G : xij > 0 ⇒
pj
−βi
=
uij
vi−ci
.
Observe that if prices are not feasible, then for some i, βi ≥ 0. If so, the relaxed KKT
conditions (3’) and (4’) will be meaningless. Recall that throughout Stage II, 0 < −βi ≤ 1
and (−βi) monotonically increases and reaches 1 at termination. Thus, at termination, the
last two KKT conditions are also ensured. For establishing a bound on the number of phases
needed in Stage II, it suffices to study the potential function
Φ′ =
∑
i∈B
β2i .
Clearly, Φ′ > 0 at the start of Stage II and increases monotonically to n. However, it turns
out to be more convenient to study the potential function Φ given in Section 9.2, which clearly
achieves the same end.
Stage I determines feasibility of the given market. What if we only wanted to solve the
promise problem of finding the equilibrium of a given feasible market? Since the prices found
by Initialization are guaranteed to be small, could we not go directly to Stage II and raise prices
until equilibrium is attained? The answer is “No”. The reason is that Stage II is guaranteed
to converge only if it is started with feasible prices. As can be seen from the proof of Lemma
10, if for some buyer i, βi > 0, then raising x will actually increase her surplus. This happens
because her money will increase at a faster rate than the rate at which flow on edge (i, t)
increases.
Thus, Stage I not only determines feasibility but, if the given market is feasible, it also finds
a suitable initial price vector for Stage II. An interesting aspect of Stage I is that it needs to
decrease prices of goods, even though it starts with a small price vector. Furthermore, it is
easy to see that if the given market is feasible and Stage I is started off with any small price
vector, not necessarily the one found by Initialization, it will terminate with a feasible price
vector. Hence we get the following interesting fact:
Lemma 36 Let M be a feasible flexible budget market and let p be small, positive prices for
it. Then, there exist positive prices q such that p weakly dominates q and prices q are feasible.
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Finally we address the question of whether a separate procedure was needed for testing feasi-
bility, especially in light of the fact that such a procedure is not needed when the primal-dual
paradigm is used for solving a non-total integral linear program. Let us illustrate the latter by
comparing, at a high level, the algorithms for the problems of maximum weight matching and
maximum weight perfect matching in bipartite graphs; for full details, see [CCPS98].
The only difference in the LP’s of these two problems is that whereas the former demands at
most 1 matched edge incident at each vertex and the latter demands exactly 1 edge. As a
result, in the dual, the vertex variables are constrained to be non-negative in the former and
unconstrained in the latter. This gives rise to an additional complementary slackness condition
in the former, i.e., any vertex with a positive dual must be matched.
The algorithm for the former problem attempts to “repair” this complementary slackness
condition one vertex at a time. It attempts to find an augmenting path from a violating
vertex, say v, by growing a “Hungarian tree” rooted at v. If another unmatched vertex enters
the tree, an augmenting path can be found and v is matched off. On the other hand, if the
tree becomes maximal without encountering another unmatched vertex, then the algorithm
is able to drive the dual of some vertex in the tree down to zero. If this vertex is v, the
complementary slackness condition at v has been repaired. If it is some other vertex, say u,
then there is an alternating path between u and v, which enables the algorithm to unmatch
u and instead match off v. This repairs the complementary slackness condition at v without
creating a violation at u.
The algorithm for the latter problem is very similar – it attempts to iteratively match off
unmatched vertices. It tries to find an augmenting path from an unmatched vertex, say v, by
growing a “Hungarian tree” rooted at v. If the tree becomes maximal without encountering
another unmatched vertex, then the number of “outer” vertices in the tree exceeds the number
of “inner” vertices by 1. Now, decreasing the duals at outer vertices by ∆ and increasing them
at inner vertices by ∆ yields a feasible dual. By letting ∆ → ∞, we get that the dual LP is
unbounded. This gives a proof of infeasibility of the primal LP.
Consider the two problemsADNB and Fisher’s linear case with the money of each agent being
unit. Observe that the latter problem is a special case of the former when the disagreement
utilities of all agents are zero, and the latter is total whereas the former is non-total. Why was
the algorithm for the former so much more elaborate than that for the latter (i.e., the DPSV
algorithm), especially in view of the fact that the algorithm for maximum weight perfect
matching is not more involved than that for maximum weight matching?
In the case of perfect matching, feasibility was ensured one vertex at a time, and when it
could not be ensured, we got a proof of infeasibility right away. In the case of rational convex
programs, the KKT conditions were enforced gradually and these conditions were fully satisfied
only right at the end. So, why can’t we simply run Stage II right to the end and then obtain
a solution or find out that the given instance was infeasible? The reason is that to guarantee
termination of Stage II, we need to start it off with a feasible price vector, i.e., we need to
determine feasibility before starting with Stage II. Hence Stage I appears to be essential.
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11 l1-norm Does Not Suffice
We give a family of examples showing that the DPSV algorithm, for Fisher’s linear case, may
end up making only inverse exponential progress in a phase if the potential function used is
the l1 norm of the surplus vector.
We will define the example in terms of 2 parameters, δ and H, which will be set at the end.
Assume B = {b0, b1, . . . , bn−1, bn} and G = {g0, g1, . . . , gn−1, gn}. At the start of the phase,
the only edges present in the network are (gi, bi), for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. The money of the buyers are
as follows:
m0 = 1 + δ, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, mi =
δ
2i
, and mn = H +
δ
n
.
The prices of goods are as follows:
p0 = 1, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, pi =
δ
2i
, and pn = H +
δ
n
.
Hence, at the start of the phase, the surplus of b0 is δ, and that of the rest of the buyers is 0.
We will set δ = 1 and H to be a large number, say n. The phase starts with I = {b0} and
J = {g0}. Assume that at the end of iteration i, edge (gi, bi−1) enters the network, and as a
result, bi enters I and gi enters J , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The increment in price in each iteration is
very small – this is easily arranged by choosing the right utilities uij ’s.
To keep the description clean, let us assume the increments in price are all zero; the numbers
can be easily modified by inverse exponential amounts to yield the desired outcome, even if
the prices need to increase in each iteration. If so, at the end of all this, the surplus of bi is
δ
2i+1
, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
and that of bn is
δ
2n−1
.
Finally, in iteration n + 1, a very slight increase in x leads to set {gn} going tight. Observe
that the reason for choosing H to be a large number is the ensure that this slight increase in
x will not make a larger set go tight. Observe that Γ({gn} = {bn, bn+1}. Now, the increase in
the price of gn needed for this is
δ
2n−1 . Since H is a large number and the increase in x is very
small, the total increase in the prices of other goods is at most a constant factor more.
In summary, the total increase in the l1 norm of p in this phase is an inverse exponential factor.
12 Discussion
Our paper provides two new pieces of evidence to show that the notion of balanced flow is basic
to the problems tackled in [DPSV08] and the current paper. The first is the result of Section
11. Second, observe that the notion of a feasible price vector was defined using balanced flows.
In view of Lemma 6 and the remarks made after it, and of Lemma 36, characterizing the sets of
small and feasible price vectors for a feasible flexible budget market is an interesting question.
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As in the case of the EG-program, the optimal solutions of convex program (2) resemble those
of a linear program rather than a nonlinear program. So, we repeat a question raised in [Vaz07]
namely, can the solution to ADNB be captured via a linear program? We believe the answers
to these questions are “no” and that establishing this in a suitable formal framework will
provide new insights into the boundary between linear and nonlinear programs.
The most prominent problem for which a rational convex program is known but a combinatorial
algorithm is not known is the linear case of the Arrow-Debreu market model, i.e., the convex
program of Jain [Jai07]. We pose the following easier question: Give a polynomial time
algorithm for this problem that uses only an LP solver. A much more general question along
these lines is stated in the Introduction.
We list some more rational convex programs and leave the problem of finding combinatorial
algorithms for them. First, generalize ADNB to additively separable, piecewise-linear, con-
cave utilities. This problem has a rational convex program, and the question of finding a
combinatorial algorithm for it becomes even more significant in view of recent results showing
PPAD-completeness of computing an equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu model with these utility
functions [CDDT09, CT09, VY10].
In an interesting paper, Kalai [Kal77] relaxed Nash’s axiom of symmetry and derived the solu-
tion concept of nonsymmetric bargaining games. The convex program capturing the solution
to the nonsymmetric extension of ADNB is also rational; moreover, this convex program
generalizes the Eisenberg-Gale program and hence captures Fisher’s linear case as well. De-
spite substantial effort, this problem has not yielded to a combinatorial algorithm. Once
it is obtained, one could consider the common generalization of the last two problems, i.e.,
nonsymmetric ADNB with additively separable, piecewise-linear, concave utilities.
On restricting ADNB (nonsymmetric ADNB) to zero disagreement utilities we get the prob-
lems of computing equilibria for linear Fisher markets with unit (arbitrary) money among
buyers. Of course, both these problems are total. It turns out that a combinatorial algorithm
for the unit money case is no easier than that for the arbitrary money case. In view of this, the
difficulty of obtaining a combinatorial algorithm for nonsymmetricADNB comes as a surprise
and may be substantiating the observation that in the setting of rational convex programs,
non-total problems behave quite differently from total problems.
All the rational convex programs mentioned above involve the log function in the objective,
together with linear constraints. Another class of rational convex programs is obtained by
having a quadratic objective function and linear constraints. It will be very interesting to
obtain combinatorial polynomial time algorithms for such rational convex programs as well.
The reader can see that the algorithm for ADNB exploits a surprisingly rich and clean struc-
ture which is, in some ways, reminiscent of the majestic structure of matching. In our experi-
ence, such structure does not occur in isolation and we believe that what we see so far is the
tip of an iceberg. This leads to the question: what does the rest of the iceberg look like?
One possibility is to seek combinatorial approximation algorithms for solving specific classes
of nonlinear convex programs. In this respect, important hints may be obtained from the
way the primal-dual paradigm was extended from solving linear programs exactly to obtaining
near-optimal solutions to linear programs within the area of approximation algorithms. The
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mechanism involved in all of the latter algorithms was that of relaxing complementary slack-
ness conditions, which was first formalized in [WGMV95]. We also note that in the setting of
approximation algorithms, the primal-dual paradigm has been successful primarily for mini-
mization problems. So, our more precise question is, “Is there a natural way of relaxing the
KKT conditions to obtain primal-dual (combinatorial) algorithms for near-optimally solving
interesting classes of (perhaps minimization) nonlinear convex programs?”
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A Solution to ADNB in the Limit
Assume that we are given an instance of game ADNB that is feasible and letM be the flexible
budget market obtained from it. In this section, we present an algorithm that converges to
the equilibrium of M in the limit.
Algorithm 3 will use the DPSV algorithm as a subroutine [DPSV08]. When this subroutine is
called, we assume that the money of each agent is fixed and is specified in the vector m.
Let N ′(p) denote the network for the case that the money of agents is fixed and specified by
vector m; this network differs from network N(p) only in that the capacities of edges going
from buyers to t are specified by m, rather than being defined as a function of the prices.
Algorithm 3 (Solution to ADNB in the Limit)
1. Initialization: ∀i ∈ B : mi ← 1.
2. Compute equilibrium prices, p, for market (u,m) using the DPSV algorithm.
3. For each i ∈ B, compute γi w.r.t. prices p, and set m
′
i ← 1 +
ci
γi
.
4. If m′ = m then output equilibrium allocations and HALT.
Else, update m to m′ and go to Step 2.
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Let p∗ and m∗ be the equilibrium prices and moneys for the flexible budget marketM, and let
p
(k) and m(k) denote the prices and moneys computed by the algorithm in the k-th iteration,
k ≥ 1.
Lemma 37 p(k) and m(k) are monotone increasing and are weakly dominated by p∗ and m∗,
respectively.
Proof : We will use the following 2 facts. First, the DPSV algorithm maintains the follow-
ing invariant throughout:
Invariant: W.r.t. current prices, p, (s,B ∪G ∪ t) is a min-cut in network N ′(p).
Second, if p are equilibrium prices for money m and if m′ is at least as large as m in each
component, then the equilibrium prices for money m′ cannot be smaller than p in any com-
ponent.
Consider the following induction hypothesis:
• the algorithm given above maintains the Invariant throughout.
• p(k) is monotone increasing (hence, for each agent i, γi is monotonically decreasing).
• m(k) is monotone increasing.
It is easy to carry out this induction simultaneously for all 3 assertions.
Using the first assertion and Lemma 6, p(k) is weakly dominated bounded by p∗. Now, using the
formula for money in flexible budget markets, it is easy to see that m(k) is weakly dominated
by m∗. ✷
Theorem 38 Algorithm 3 converges to the equilibrium prices and moneys of market M in
the limit.
Proof : We will use the following fact: for the linear case of Fisher’s model, the analog
of Lemma 4 holds, i.e., if p are equilibrium prices for money m, then in network N ′(p),
(s,B∪G∪y) and (s∪B∪G, t) must both be min-cuts (for a proof, see Lemma 5.2 in [Vaz07]).
Since p(k) and m(k) are monotone increasing and bounded, they must converge. Let p(0) and
m
(0) be their limit points. W.r.t. these prices and moneys, it must be the case that for each
i ∈ B, mi = 1 + ci/γi and (s,B ∪ G ∪ t) and (s ∪ B ∪ G, t) must both be min-cuts in the
corresponding network (by the fact stated above). Using lemma 4 we get that p(0) and m(0)
are equilibrium prices and moneys for market M. ✷
Finally, by Theorem 3 we get:
Corollary 39 Algorithm 3 converges to the Nash bargaining solution for ADNB.
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